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Abstract: 
Researchers have advocated real options thinking (ROT) for evaluating and managing risky IT investments to account 
for managerial decision flexibility. Effective ROT is a three-step process that requires managers to recognize, value, 
and exercise options embedded in IT projects. Prior research has illustrated the existence of managerial bias in the 
recognizing and valuing real options. However, little research has examined real options exercise decisions. Hence, we 
use prospect theory to examine whether IT managers demonstrate systematic biases while exercising real options in 
IT projects and portfolios. We also study whether one can control or mitigate such biases. We found evidence of biased 
(suboptimal) real option exercise decisions in IT projects and in IT portfolios. However, we found differences in biased 
decision making between a single project and a portfolio scenario. We also found that project scale and real option type 
influenced vulnerability of a project to biased decision making. In addition, simplifying the presentation of the net effects 
of real options exercise decisions can help reduce bias, especially for large project portfolios. We discuss the 
implications of these results on theory and practice. 
Keywords: Real Options, Growth Options, Abandonment Options, Information Technology, IT Portfolios. 
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1 Introduction 
IT projects are high risk-high return endeavors (Benaroch, Jeffery, Kauffman, & Shah, 2007) with high failure 
rates (Sandish Group, 2014). IT managers often need to make decisions regarding their projects with 
incomplete or ill-structured information (Tiwana, Wang, Keil, & Ahluwalia, 2007). Research has proposed 
real options valuation (ROV) as a way to manage uncertainty by considering decision making flexibility in 
important capital investments. While ROV allows one to more accurately valuate capital investments 
(Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999; Benaroch, 2002; Tiwana, Keil, & Fichman, 2006), the complexity of the 
method makes adopting and implementing it challenging. In practice, managers apply real option thinking 
(ROT) more frequently than ROV (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Fichman, Keil, & Tiwana, 2005; Davis, 2015) 
because it is relatively simple to use. ROT refers to intuitive decision making of real option exercise decisions 
after identifying real options embedded in an investment. According to Fichman et al. (2005), ROT 
complements ROV if used effectively. ROT is a three-step process that requires managers to recognize, 
value, and exercise options embedded in IT projects for it to me effective. Studies have shown that various 
systematic biases exist while recognizing and valuing real options (Lankton & Luft, 2008; Tiwana et al., 
2006, 2007). For example, IT managers value real options subjectively, and such valuation differs across 
option types. Specifically, IT managers value growth options and options to defer an investment higher than 
other options, such as option to scale or to abandon a project (Tiwana et al., 2007). Previous research 
illustrates that subjective frames impact real option valuation in general and in IT projects in particular (Miller 
& Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2007). However, little research has examined how biases affect how 
managers exercise real options. We need to study real option exercise decisions because real options’ 
value depends on when they are exercised. Real options are valued with the assumption of optimal exercise 
(Kumar, 2002). Optimally exercising a real option refers to exercising it at a time period (before expiration) 
when one receives the highest benefit from doing so. Although some researchers have suggested that real 
options are suboptimally exercised in practice (Copeland & Tufano, 2004, Khan, Khouja, & Kumar, 2013), 
we lack empirical evidence to support these suggestions and to support the assumption that real options 
are optimally exercised. Hence, we seek insights into whether managers can fully realize the value of real 
options by exercising them optimally.  
Building on Khan, Kumar, Khouja, and Zhao’s (2010) propositions, we use prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) to understand how IT managers may make real option exercise decisions in an IT project 
setting. Managers make real option exercise decisions under uncertainty associated with the future 
outcomes (Coff & Laverty, 2007), and these decisions have risk associated with uncertainty. Prospect theory 
analyzes decision making under risk and explains decision makers’ tendencies while evaluating risky 
alternatives. It shows that, based on the framing of alternatives, people deviate from risk neutrality by 
overweighting alternatives with certain outcomes and underweighting alternatives with uncertain outcomes 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Researchers have extensively applied prospect theory in the psychology, 
consumer behavior, investment behavior, and financial markets fields. We explore if prospect theory can 
explain real option exercise decisions. We study real option exercise in the context of a single IT project and 
in a portfolio setting, where using ROT is more complex due to the presence of multiple concurrent projects. 
We empirically test our hypotheses through survey data from 310 IT professionals. As prior research has 
recognized (Fichman, et al., 2005) and as we mention above, using the real options method to manage 
project risk is a three-step process. We focus on one underresearched stage; namely, exercising the option. 
We choose to explore option exercise independently as an initial effort. With our results, we plan to 
investigate this phenomenon further as a complete process that could include all steps. We discuss the 
limitations and future research directions in detail later in the study. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study is one of the first to focus on real options 
exercise decisions (i.e., realized value from real options) instead of real options valuation problems (i.e., 
expected value from real options). Researchers have not studied real option exercise decisions in the IT 
context thus far due possibly to the topic’s infancy and the lack of conceptualization of real option exercise 
decisions. Hence, our results make an important contribution to an underresearched aspect of the real options 
literature in MIS. Second, we conceptualize the real option exercise decisions for empirical studies based on 
financial and economic theories. This conceptualization may help in further studies of real option exercise 
decisions. Third, we contribute to the literature and practice of IT project and portfolio management by 
comparing how managers use ROT in both single project and portfolio settings. Fourth, we investigate the 
vulnerability of real option exercise decisions to decision biases. Our results challenge the fundamental 
assumption of risk-neutrality in the real option exercise and provide opportunities for exploring similar 
phenomena in the future. Finally, we extend the literature on behavioral decision making by studying IT real 
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options from the prospect theory perspective. From a managerial perspective, our results help increase 
awareness about how managerial bias could affect ROT in practice. Managers who are aware of the presence 
of these biases could use ROT more effectively. We discuss the practical implications later in the study. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we review the relevant literature and present our hypotheses. 
In Section 3, we detail our research design and methodology. In Section 4, we present our results. Finally, 
in Section 5, we discuss the results and their implications. 
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Real Options and IT Investment 
Real options in IT investments offer managerial flexibility to change a project’s course in response to 
endogenous or exogenous events (Davis, 2015). Several types of real options may exist in an IT project, 
including growth options and options to defer, switch, scale, or abandon the project (Benaroch et al., 
2007). Each option type provides a different type of flexibility for the project. For example, an option to 
abandon a failing project mid-way may help to minimize losses. A growth option provides managers an 
opportunity to increase a project’s net value by allowing additional investment in the project. For a detailed 
taxonomy on real options in the IT context, please refer to Benaroch et al. (2007). Although real options 
provide a tool for hedging unsystematic risk in IT projects, significant uncertainty persists when exercising 
them (Coff & Laverty, 2007). 
Several studies have focused on using real options for IT investment and project management. They range 
from conceptualizations of IT investments with real options (Kumar, 1996, 2002), valuation methods for the IT 
real options (Benaroch, 2002; Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999; Kauffman & Li, 2005; Taudes, Feuerstine, & Mild, 
2000), and whether ROT agrees with ROV (Fichman et al., 2005; Tiwana et al., 2007). Some studies show 
that managerial intuition is typically consistent with the factors that determine normative real options values 
even without explicit real options methods or training (Bowman & Hurry, 2003; Miller & Arikan, 2004). Another 
school of thought argues that intuition is not always qualitatively consistent with real options analysis (Busby 
& Pitts, 1997; Lankton & Luft, 2008; Miller & Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2006, 2007), and researchers have 
explored the presence and effects of various biases that could impact ROT at different steps (Table 1). 
After recognizing and valuing the embedded options in projects (Fichman et al., 2005), managers commit 
to the options based on their value (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). Option holders commit to an option by 
determining its value and paying an upfront price for it. In the case of IT projects, IT managers commit to an 
option through committing to the project that holds the real option. In determining the value of a real option 
at the commitment stage, we assume that the IT manager will exercise the option optimally. An optimal 
exercise decision means that the IT manager controls the unsystematic risk in the investment in an unbiased 
and risk-neutral1 manner. However, prior literature suggests that, during the commitment stage, “expected 
real options’ value” is susceptible to human decision making biases (Miller & Shapira, 2004). These biases 
are reflected as different values IT managers ascribe to different real options (Tiwana et al., 2006). Prior 
studies also show that the consistency between managerial intuition and real option values varies across 
option types and settings (Benaroch, Lichtenstein, & Robinson, 2006a). Evidence from practice also shows 
that individuals do not optimally exercise real options (Copeland & Tufano, 2004), which leads to a decrease 
in their value. Evidence from literature and practice has motivated our investigating the existence of 
managerial biases on the “realized real option value” in an IT context. We do so by studying the “real option 
exercise decisions” in varying project contexts based on prospect theory. 
We use the term “managerial bias” or “bias” to describe any deviation from the decision that a rational economic 
agent would make in a similar situation. Given that real options theory and its application in IS uses a risk-neutral 
framework for valuing options (Benaroch, 2000; Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999), we consider a rational economic 
agent as a risk-neutral investor. Hence, a rational economic agent would exercise real options optimally, and 
bias would result in a suboptimal option exercise decision. In this study, we use the terms “rational decision 
versus optimal decision” and “biased decision versus suboptimal decision” interchangeably. 
                                                     
1 During a risky decision process, an agent is considered risk-neutral when the agent pursues the highest yield while ignoring the 
associated risk. In other words, risk-neutral agents are indifferent to identical expected outcomes regardless of the underlying 
probabilities The Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem further explains risk-neutral behavior (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1953). 
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Table 1. Literature on Intuitive Valuation of Real Options 
Reference Theory used Major results Respondents 
Busby & Pitts 
(1997) 
Real options 
theory 
Decision makers in industry evaluate flexibility in capital 
investments by: 
• Using periodic reviews or project milestones. 
• Ensuring greater flexibility to response to business environment 
for long projects. 
• Clearly defining exit strategies along with options to delay. 
• Evaluating all possible negative outcomes. 
Senior finance 
officers 
Howell & 
Jägle (1997) 
Human 
information 
processing 
Managers intuitively value real growth options intermittently and 
generally optimistically. However, managers’ responses to 
changes in current position of IT asset price (value), volatility, and 
maturity tended to be in the “correct” direction. 
Managers 
Miller & 
Shapira 
(2004) 
Prospect 
theory and 
framing effects 
Purchasers/sellers of call and put options price them relative to 
their payoffs/losses. 
MBA students Discount rates decrease with option duration, and the steepness 
of decline decreases with time. 
Call/put option sellers and buyers discount exercise price. 
Tiwana et al. 
(2006) 
Escalation of 
commitment 
Presence of real options in a project increases the likelihood of 
continuation of an IT project with negative feedback. 
Managers Prospect 
theory and 
framing effects 
Managers perceive growth options embedded in an IT project as 
adding more value to the firm than operating options. 
Tiwana et al. 
(2007) 
Bounded 
rationality 
Under uncertainty, managers associate embedded options 
(growth, switch, stage, scale, defer, and abandon) with IT project 
value in case of a low NPV. 
Managers 
Lankton & 
Luft (2008) 
Regret theory 
Under uncertainty, deferral options are intuitively valued more 
than growth options in IT projects. 
MBA students 
The presence of competition decreases the value of deferral 
options and increases the value of growth options. 
Denison 
(2009) 
Escalation of 
commitment 
Participants who explicitly consider real options in a project 
exhibit less escalation of commitment than do users of net 
present value analysis alone 
Graduate students 
Denison, 
Farrell & 
Jackson, 
(2012) 
Real options 
theory 
Supervising managers rely less on the real options than the 
planned path component of project value in long-term projects. 
The extent to which supervising managers rely on the real options 
component of value in their funding decisions can be influenced 
by aggregating or disaggregating the components of project value 
in a financial summary of subordinates’ long-term investment 
proposals because the report format influences perceptions of the 
relative accuracy of the planned path and real options 
components of project value. 
Students 
We consider two types of real options in this study: growth and abandonment options. From options 
perspective, one can see an IT investment project as creating a base asset with some expected value 
(Tiwana et al., 2007). A growth option captures the possibility of building additional assets on top of the base 
asset (Benaroch, 2002). For example, when implementing an enterprise resource planning (ERP) package 
is the baseline project, managers can build a data warehouse (i.e., the additional asset) to facilitate the 
analysis of data captured in the ERP system. Abandonment options refer to flexible actions that managers 
can make to reduce the potential losses on the base project. It is important to note that, in the case of 
abandonment options, there is only one asset under evaluation (i.e., the base system), while, in the case of 
growth options, there are multiple assets to consider (the base system, plus one or more future investment 
in assets that build on the base system). We consider these two types of real options because of their 
common recurrence in IT projects in practice. 
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2.2 Prospect Theory and Risky Decisions 
Prospect theory suggests that people commonly frame risky choices as either gains or losses. They appear 
to be risk averse for choices involving gains and risk seeking for choices involving losses (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). For example, managers could avoid high risk-high return projects because they prefer 
smaller but relatively certain gains over higher yet probable gains. Their preferences change with situations 
involve losses, where decision makers strongly favor a probable but higher loss over a certain but smaller 
loss. Managers’ preference for bigger yet probable losses in the future over certain but smaller losses today 
may lead to difficulty in abandoning a poorly performing IT project. 
Prospect theory divides the choice process into two phases. In the first phase (framing and editing), one 
preliminarily analyzes the decision problem, which frames the possible actions, contingencies, and 
outcomes. In the second phase (evaluation), one evaluates the framed prospects and selects the prospect 
of highest value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). In the evaluation phase, individuals makes choices 
based on the decision problem’s framing, and the choices reflect specific risk behaviors. 
2.3 Prospect Theory and Real Option Exercise Decisions 
The real options literature illustrates that, while valuing real options, managers’ perceptions follow prospect 
theory predictions. According to Miller and Shapira (2004), the buyers and sellers frame real call options2 
as gains and real put options as losses during real option evaluation. Due to this framing of real options, 
buyers and sellers are likely to show risk-averse behavior for call options and risk-seeking behavior for put 
options at the options’ purchase time. These effects are reflected in the real option price that each party is 
willing to pay or receive. 
In IT projects, growth options are like call options, whereas abandonment options are like put options 
(Benaroch, 2002). While valuing projects with real options, managers ascribe the greatest importance to 
projects with growth options and the least importance to the projects with abandonment options (Busby & Pitts, 
1997). Similar results hold for IT projects where IT managers perceive a growth option as adding more value 
to the project than any other type of option. Hence, research has shown IT managers to ascribe the least value 
to abandonment options (Tiwana et al., 2006). Such perceptual framing of growth and abandonment options 
suggests the vulnerability of such options to the risk preferences of IT managers at the time of their exercise. 
For example, while IT managers value projects with growth options higher during the commitment stage, they 
may not realize the optimal value of a growth option at the exercise stage. Also, with situations involving certain 
smaller gains and probable larger gains, certainty effects dominate, indicating risk-averse behavior 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, pp. 297-298). IT managers may deviate from the 
rational option exercise decision due to their risk aversion for choices that involve gains. 
Abandonment options may suffer from suboptimal exercise due to the difficulty in exercising the option. 
Some reasons identified for the difficulty to exercise include the “sunk cost effect” and “face saving” (Keil, 
Mann, & Rai, 2000), fear of disruption in ongoing project operations, negative impact on the team’s morale 
and credibility, and the inability of the abandonment option to provide a sense of accomplishment as 
compared to other real options except curtailing losses (Tiwana et al., 2007). Those challenges could lead 
to delay or IT managers’ failure to exercise. 
Perceiving abandonment option as loss may be another reason why IT managers ascribe the least value to 
abandonment options (Miller & Shapira, 2004). Hence, while exercising them, IT managers might exhibit risk-
seeking behavior. For example, usually IT managers tend to wait when projects are not performing well with 
the hope that the temporary phase might pass and the project will pick up soon (Keil, Depledge, & Rai, 2007). 
Also, in situations that involve certain smaller loss and probable larger loss, certainty effects dominate, 
indicating risk-seeking behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Given these arguments, we believe that real 
options may be subject to biased exercise. In Sections 2.4 to 2.8, we build our hypotheses for scenarios where 
IT managers may be inclined towards biased decision making for growth and abandonment options. 
2.4 Real Options Exercise Decisions and IT Project Size 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), risk preferences vary according to the stakes involved in the 
decision. For example, individuals perceive the subjective value difference between a gain of $10 and a 
                                                     
2 Real call option on an asset gives the option holder a right to further invest in the asset for future expansion (change). Real put option 
on an asset gives the option holder a right to sell the asset (reduce its scope or sell it) (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). 
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gain of $20 to be greater than the subjective value difference between a gain of $110 and a gain of $120, 
which leads to greater risk-averse behavior for risky decisions involving smaller amounts. Similar behavior 
holds true for losses unless the larger loss is intolerable. Hence, the marginal value of both gains and losses 
generally decreases with their magnitude. IT projects also vary in terms of their scope and investment costs. 
For example, according to an Aberdeen Group survey (2007), an average total cost of an ERP system 
ranges from US$0.4 million to US$2.2 million depending on the vendor and the number of system users. 
Hence, one of the dominant decision variables in a real option exercise decision is the amount at stake. For 
a project with a growth option, several factors reflect a project’s size, such as the project’s base value, 
follow-up costs involved, and the increment in project value after the growth option is exercised. For projects 
with an abandonment option, the extent of loss incurred and loss saved after the abandonment option is 
exercised reflect size. In the IS literature, we find evidence that an increase in the project size leads to more 
biased decisions. Escalation of commitment is more likely in the case of larger projects, which research has 
explained via the “sunk cost” effect (Keil et al., 2000). Decision makers tend to be more willing to continue 
a project when the sunk cost level is high. We also find anecdotal evidence of difficulty in terminating large-
scale projects. Examples include Denver International Airport’s baggage system (Keil & Montealegre, 2000) 
and London’s Taurus stock exchange project (Drummond, 1996). In these cases, research has shown the 
size of the project along with other factors, such as managers’ reputation and the political ramifications of 
abandoning (Keil et al., 2000), to increase the difficulty in abandoning the project. In larger IT projects with 
abandonment options, sunk costs are higher compared to smaller projects, which, in turn, might make 
escalation of commitment more likely. These findings are counter-intuitive to prospect theory predictions for 
the potential effect of project size on real options exercise decisions. 
For a project with a growth option, a larger project usually requires a larger follow-up investment, which 
increases the project’s stakes, as compared to its small counterparts. Factors such as technology market, 
competitive market position, and importance of IT investment in the organization tend to make organizations 
cautious about their investments. When organizations are more cautious and when IT managers’ reputation 
depends on a project’s performance, they may become more conservative in their investment approach. 
Keeping in view the evidence from IS literature on escalation of commitment and the strategic bend towards 
technology spending in the past few years, we believe the prospect theory predictions might not hold. Based 
on these arguments, we propose: 
H1a:  IT managers are more likely to make a suboptimal decision for a large IT project with a growth 
option than for a small IT project with a growth option.  
H1b:  IT managers are more likely to make a suboptimal decision for a large IT project with an 
abandonment option than for a small IT project with an abandonment option. 
2.5 Single Projects: Real Option Type 
While evaluating gains and losses, people tend to be loss averse since they usually prefer avoiding losses 
than acquiring gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which means that people are more sensitive to losses than 
to gains and their displeasure associated with losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure 
associated with winning the same amount. Researchers have used loss aversion to explain several decision 
making paradoxes such as people’s reluctance to accept fair bets on a toss of a coin (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981) and the discrepancies between the amount of money people are willing to pay for a good and the 
compensation they demand to give it up (Bishop & Heberlein, 1979; Knetsch & Sinden, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). Researchers have also used this phenomenon to explain the endowment effect in which 
the selling price for consumption goods is much higher than the buying price (often by a factor of two or more). 
Due to loss aversion, the value of a good to an individual appears to be higher when they view the good as 
something that they could lose or give up than when they evaluate it as a potential gain (Kahneman, 2003). 
Extending loss aversion to real option exercise decisions in IT investments means that the reaction to losses 
associated with an abandonment option will tend to be stronger than a reaction to gains associated with a 
growth option. Hence, suboptimal decision making at the option exercise time for abandonment options is 
more likely to occur than in the case of growth options. 
H1c:  IT managers are more likely to make a suboptimal exercise decision for an IT project with an 
abandonment option than for a similar IT project with a growth option. 
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2.6 IT Portfolios and Real Option Exercise Decisions 
For strategic decisions that involve high stakes for an organization, managers need to make decisions 
objectively and inclusively by considering all the alternatives and integrating a variety of information 
(Bukszar & Connolly, 1988). Decisions pertaining to IT portfolios are no different. An IT portfolio is a 
collection of individual IT projects managed collectively (Bardhan, Bagchi, & Sougstad, 2004; Benaroch, 
Shah, & Jeffery, 2006b). The overall objective of portfolio management is to maximize the net value of the 
portfolio by balancing the combined risk and value of individual projects. 
Portfolios of IT projects allow IT managers to take advantage of diversification opportunities that real options 
facilitate. For example, consider two resource-interdependent IT projects in a portfolio. One of the projects 
embeds an abandonment option, and its status indicates poor performance with a very low chance of 
recovery. The other project is performing well and has a good chance of reaping additional value contingent 
on further investment. This project also embeds a growth option. In this scenario, the IT manager can take 
advantage of real options and maximize the portfolio’s economic value by terminating one project by 
exercising the abandonment option and reallocating resources to the other project. However, if IT managers 
view these respective decisions as a gain versus a loss, they might be inclined to avoid abandoning the 
poorly performing project and to let the good performing project take its regular course to avoid further risk. 
This decision would negatively affect the net portfolio outcome. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found a similar phenomenon among individuals who face risky decisions. 
Naming it “narrow framing”, they show that, when making multiple risky decisions simultaneously, individuals 
tend to consider related problems individually by isolating them from each other. Isolation means decision 
makers ignore all the relevant current information and/or future implications of their decisions. Hence, 
narrow framing is the tendency to evaluate risky prospects in isolation rather than associating them with 
other risks they face (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). As Kahneman (2003) puts 
it: “decisions made in narrow frames depart far more from risk neutrality than decisions that are made in a 
more inclusive context” (pp. 14). Several studies have focused on finding the causes that lead to narrow 
framing. The list includes intuitive thinking (Kahneman, 2003), decision makers’ risk preferences 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993), loss aversion (Barberis, Huang, & Thaler, 2006), and regret (Barberis & 
Huang, 2006). Kahneman (2003) suggests that narrow framing occurs when individuals make decisions 
intuitively instead of through systematic reasoning and, hence, specify intuitive thinking as a cause of narrow 
framing. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) state that: “if a decision maker is risk averse in some situations and 
risk seeking in others, they end up paying a premium to avoid some risks and a premium to obtain others” 
(p. 19). This statement suggests that the way individuals intuitively frame decisions leads them to view 
decisions narrowly. Barberis and Huang (2006) argue that regret3-prone individuals are more likely to 
engage in narrow framing. Similarly, Barberis et al. (2006) identify “aversion to losses” as a cause of narrow 
framing. Hence, framing a decision narrowly may affect the overall IT portfolio performance. Thaler, Tversky, 
Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997) suggest that narrow framers evaluate projects one at a time rather than 
as a part of a portfolio. We explain above that options embedded in individual projects are vulnerable to the 
risk preferences of IT managers during the options’ exercise stage. Combining these arguments with the 
complexity of the real option exercise decision in portfolios, we hypothesize: 
H2a:  When IT managers exercise real options in an IT portfolio, they are likely to make suboptimal 
exercise decisions. 
Referring to the above discussion about the causes of narrow framing, individuals may frame the decisions 
narrowly either due to their respective risk preferences/tolerance, aversion to losses, or aversion to the 
feeling of regret associated with bad decisions. In the case of an IT portfolio, either or all of the causes might 
hold depending on the decision makers and how they comprehend the different mixes of option exercise 
decisions appearing in a portfolio. For example, an IT manager who is risk averse for losses may display 
this behavior in decisions that involve some extent of losses. Prospect theory suggests that this behavior 
should be consistent regardless of how the decisions appear. Hence, it would hold for single decisions and 
in portfolios. In fact, this risk behavior will drive the decision away from rationality and towards isolation. 
Therefore, how IT managers exercise individual real options in a portfolio should be consistent with how 
they exercise them in single projects. Once the decisions are isolated from each other in a complex decision 
scenario, the decision maker perceives them as mutually exclusive decisions, which causes them to ignore 
the relevance of relationships among these decisions (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Consequently, a risk-
                                                     
3 Regret refers to the decision maker’s feeling of having made the wrong choice compared to a better alternative (Roese & Olson, 
2014). 
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seeking manager will remain a risk seeker for losses regardless of decisions for a single project or for a 
portfolio. The same will hold true for a risk-averse manager in the case of gains. Hence, prospect theory 
preferences will affect the realized option value regardless of the real options’ presentation as a single 
decision or a cumulative decision in a portfolio. 
H2b:  For an IT project, IT managers’ real option exercise decisions will remain the same whether 
they evaluate the project independently or as a part of a portfolio. 
2.7 IT Portfolio and Resource Interdependency 
In a portfolio, projects may share various resources, such as financial resources (where a portfolio needs 
to be maintained out of a budget pool) and human resources (when the same set of people are responsible 
to develop, implement and maintain the projects involved in the portfolio). The challenge in this case is to 
maximize portfolio value while efficiently using the scarce resources at hand. Such interdependencies 
initiate competition for scarce resources (Throp, 1999). Also, such interdependencies act as constraints on 
the portfolio and affect the portfolio’s strategic alignment with the firm’s goals (Goldman, 1999). Hence, 
efficiently managing these scarce resources is vital for project portfolio management. The IS literature 
highlights the contribution of effective resource management in IS projects by promoting de-escalation of 
commitment in failing projects (Keil & Robey, 1999). Research has suggested becoming aware of alternative 
uses of the funds supporting a project as a way to reduce decision making in isolation (Keil & Robey, 1999; 
Northcraft & Neale, 1986). Research has shown that highlighting the alternative uses of remaining resources 
leads to decisions that closely reflect the cost/benefit prescriptions (Northcraft & Neale, 1986) instead of 
subjective decisions based on risk behaviors. Resource interdependency may encourage IT project 
managers to consider the impact of each option’s exercise decision on the portfolio’s net outcome and 
improve the overall portfolio performance. 
H3:  Recognition of resource interdependency among projects in an IT portfolio will improve the 
portfolio’s rational exercise decision making by IT managers. 
2.8 IT Portfolio Size 
We hypothesize earlier that an increase in a project’s size may intensify biased decision making for growth 
and abandonment options due to economic recession effects, a shrinking technology market, and greater 
sunk cost effects in larger projects. We extend the same argument for IT portfolios that comprise growth 
and abandonment options and propose: 
H4:  Increasing project sizes in an IT portfolio will reduce the portfolio’s rational exercise decision 
making by IT managers. 
3 Research Design and Methodology 
While several studies have provided information about valuing real options, we still lack evidence on what real 
option exercise decisions might look like. In order to simulate the real option exercise decisions in this study, 
we need to: 1) realistically conceptualizing IT real options and 2) model real options exercise scenarios based 
on their conceptualization. We discuss both actions in this section and use them to create the survey profiles. 
3.1 Conceptualizing IT Real Options 
One can conceptualize a real option in an IT project as an American option that one can exercise at any 
point up until the expiration. For example, one can view a growth option as a compound option, where 
investment in any time period can result in an option to make a further investment in the next time period 
(Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). However, conceptualizing IT real options in this manner makes it hard to value 
them and, hence, the IS literature has leaned towards a simpler conceptualization (i.e., European options, 
with a single deterministic expiration and exercise time) (e.g., Su, Akkiraju, Nayak, & Goodwin, 2009). 
Comparing the two conceptualizations, the general consensus is that an IT real option behaves more like 
an American type option than a European type option (Benaroch, 2002). A simpler conceptualization of an 
American option is the one where there are discrete milestones or review points, such as Black’s 
approximation of an American call option (Hull, 2006). For our purposes, this simpler conceptualization is 
appropriate due to our focus on the option exercise decision. 
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Consider a fairly general software-implementation scenario such as an ERP system implementation with 
two modules. Implementing each module could result in benefits such as cost reductions, revenue 
increases, or both. Such projects are often implemented in phases. Management may not commit to 
implementing both modules at the start of the project. Implementation of the second module may depend 
on implementation progress of the first module (Bardhan et al., 2004; Benaroch et al., 2006a). Such a 
strategy provides managerial implementation flexibility. However, there might be a lead-time involved in 
procuring resources (contracting for and procuring hardware, software, and personnel) required for the 
second module. Hence, waiting until completing the first module could delay the implementation of the 
second module and, thus, delay any benefits (dividends) resulting from implementing the second module. 
It might be best to make a decision regarding future investment before completing the first module. 
Management has an option to grow or abandon the project depending on its progress, which one can 
capture as an expected NPV. In theory, the growth option is an American option, which one can exercise 
any time during the course of the project. In practice, one may make such decisions at discrete review 
points. One can find examples of such situations in an IT infrastructure context in Panayi and Trigeorgis 
(1998) and Taudes et al. (2000). 
3.2 Modeling a Real Option Exercise Decision 
Exercising an option is a decision that involves considering risk. Research has conceptualized decision 
making under risk as choices between prospects or gambles (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The closest 
approximation of capturing such decisions in organizations is to treat them like a gamble (Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993), which is characterized by uncertainty and the dependency of payoffs on a decision. We used 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) design for testing the “framing of act”. Their experiment captured “risky 
choice framing” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986) with implications for 
prospect theory in terms of certainty effects, loss aversion, and narrow framing of decisions. The gambling 
design is a popular design to capture risk preferences in various disciplines including business, economics 
(Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998), and real option valuation (Miller & Shapira, 2004). In IT project 
management, top management uses the expected value method (EVM) to quantitatively analyze the best 
course of action in situations where future outcomes are uncertain (Wu, Ong, & Hsu, 2008). EVM is close 
to the gambling design; hence, the gambling design appears to be the simplest yet most realistic way to 
represent a real option exercise decision. 
We conducted a survey among IT professionals, and Table 2 summarizes our survey characteristics based on 
Kuhberger’s (1998) taxonomy for risky choice design. We gave each survey participant eight decision scenario 
profiles that varied in terms of option type, project size, and decision scenario presentation. Appendices A and B 
provide additional details for decision scenario profiles, independent and dependent variables, and survey4. 
Table 2. Decision Scenarios’ Characteristics 
Risk characteristics 
Characteristics In our study, we used Explanation 
Risk manipulation Reference point 
We based risk manipulation for project scenarios on NPV of the 
projects as reference points (Fichman et al., 2005). We presented 
the positive and negative outcomes with respect to zero NPV to 
the respondents. 
Quality of risk Riskless/risky option 
Each real option decision comprised a risky and a riskless decision 
so we could map real options to risk averse and risk-seeking 
behavior based on prospect theory. 
Number of risky 
events 
Single/multiple risk 
event 
Each project decision scenario had only one risky decision against 
a riskless one. For a portfolio scenario, there were two risk events.  
Task characteristics 
Characteristics In our study, we used Explanation 
Framing manipulation Task-responsive 
We induced the gain/loss perception by risk manipulation. We did 
not label outcomes as gains or losses. 
                                                     
4 Complete survey and additional details for decision scenario profiles and independent and dependent variables is available in the 
supplementary material. 
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Table 2. Decision Scenarios’ Characteristics 
Response mode Choice 
Each respondent had to make a choice for each real option 
scenario. Choice responses dominate framing research 
(Kuhberger, 1998). 
Comparison Within subjects We analyzed data within subjects. 
Unit of analysis Individual We used individual responses to test the hypotheses. 
Problem domain Economic 
Real options decisions in it investments are an economic decision 
problem. 
Participant characteristics 
Characteristic In our study, we used Explanation 
Sample Target sample 
We conducted our survey among the target sample of IT 
professionals involved with project and portfolio decisions. 
3.3 Sample and Data 
We pilot tested the decision scenarios among MBA students at a large U.S. university. We obtained a total 
of 37 usable responses to test the quality of the questions and the clarity of the project and portfolio 
scenarios. We made minor modifications based on the feedback. We further tested the decision scenarios 
using Dun & Bradstreet’s 2010 executives list (Tiwana et al., 2006, 2007) that comprised top and mid-level 
management in U.S. organizations involved in IT management. We obtained a total of 43 usable responses 
to pre-test the decision scenarios among professionals. Based on the results, we determined that we did 
not need to make any modifications. We sent the finalized questionnaire to 1821 IT management 
professionals in the US and abroad using Project Management Institute (PMI) U.S. chapters and 
communities of practice. The target sample comprised IT professionals from different industries. We 
received 331 responses (for an 18.18% response rate). Of these responses, 310 were complete. Further, 
180 responses were from U.S. respondents and 130 from international respondents. 
All values for all variables were within acceptable ranges, which suggested that there were no data entry errors. 
We detected some univariate outliers for the variable “real options experience”. As such, we computed the 
descriptive statistics with and without outliers, but they stayed the same. Hence, we retained the observations in 
the data set. We checked for multicollinearity and normality of distribution for the control variables. We dropped 
the variable “age” from the analysis based on VIF (2.94 with work experience) and bivariate correlation (0.8 with 
work experience). In terms of normality of data distribution, some variables were slightly skewed but not enough 
to merit data transformation. Tables 3 and 4 provide the respondents’ demographic information. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N = 310) 
  
Frequency Percent Cumulative percent 
Gender 
Female 60 19.4 19.4 
Male 250 80.6 100 
Sector 
Manufacturing 176 56.8 56.8 
Services 134 43.2 100 
Firm size 
Less than 1 million 62 20 20 
1 Million - 500 Million 122 39.4 59.4 
500 Million - 1 Billion 37 11.9 71.3 
More than 1 Billion 89 28.7 100 
Age 
 
Less than 20 51 16.5 16.5 
20-29 49 15.8 32.3 
30-39 55 17.7 50 
40-50 59 19 69 
Above 50 96 31 100 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N = 310) 
Work experience 
Less than 4 years 2 0.6 0.6 
5-9 years 38 12.3 12.9 
10-14 years 55 17.7 30.6 
15-20 years 44 14.2 44.8 
Above 20 years 171 55.2 100 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics: Experience (N = 310) 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Experience: it 
investment 
1 5 3.22 1.164 
Experience: real 
options 
1 5 3.29 1.138 
Experience: portfolio 
management 
1 5 2.93 1.188 
When comparing answers between early and late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977), we did not 
find any significant non-response bias. To check for non-response bias, we compared our test sample with 
the pilot test respondents on six demographic dimensions. We selected this sample because of the 
similarities between these two groups. The survey was sent out in two phases. We used Pearson’s 
correlation to calculate the effect size because it is one of the most common effect size measures (Rosenthal 
& DiMatteo, 2001). We found no significant difference between early (phase 1) and late (phase 2) 
respondents on any scale (Table 5). The effect sizes were negligible. By inference, we conclude that 
responders and non-responders did not differ and that we did not have a nonresponse bias on our surveys. 
Table 5. Comparison of Early and Late Responders on Six Demographic Scales 
 
Phase 1 and 2 N Mean SD Difference 
Effect 
size* 
Age 
Early respondents 43 4.39 0.903   
Late respondents 310 3.32 1.47 1.07 0.106 
Firm size 
Early respondents 43 2.83 0.92   
Late respondents 310 2.49 1.11 0.34 0.084 
Work experience 
Early respondents 43 4.79 0.56   
Late respondents 310 4.11 1.13 0.68 0.073 
IT investment experience 
Early respondents 43 4.63 0.59   
Late respondents 310 3.22 1.16 1.41 0.193 
Real options experience 
Early respondents 43 4.14 1.06   
Late respondents 310 3.29 1.13 0.85 0.159 
Portfolio management 
experience 
Early respondents 43 3.98 1.1   
Late respondents 310 2.93 1.18 1.05 0.113 
* We calculated effect size using Pearson’s correlation. 
4 Results and Analysis 
4.1 Real Option Exercise Decisions in Single Projects 
We coded the data as binary where 1 represented the rational response (optimal exercise decision) and 0 
represented the biased response (suboptimal exercise decision). Further, we coded the portfolio data as 
Table 6 shows. Rational responses were the economically dominant ones, and we considered any other 
responses as biased. For each real option, the economic dominant choices were the ones with the higher 
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net value after accounting for uncertainty. Appendix A provides additional details for decision scenario 
profiles and the respective choice mapping5. 
Table 6. Coding key to calculate portfolio choices 
Possible portfolio 
outcomes 
Growth option response in 
the portfolio 
Abandonment option 
response in the portfolio 
Portfolio outcome 
Scenario 1 1 (correct choice) 1 (correct choice) 1 (correct choice) 
Scenario 2 1 (correct choice) 0 (incorrect choice) 0 (incorrect choice) 
Scenario 3 0 (incorrect choice) 1 (correct choice) 0 (incorrect choice) 
Scenario 4 0 (incorrect choice) 0 (incorrect choice) 0 (incorrect choice) 
We used non-parametric frequency analysis to evaluate the responses for each decision scenario followed by 
a Chi-square test (Table 7). According to the results, respondents took a significant proportion of biased 
decisions for the growth options (project 1 and 3), abandonment options (project 2 and 4), and portfolios. 
Specifically, project 3 and all three portfolios had more biased decisions than rational ones. Furthermore, we 
used a Chi-square test to test whether IT managers were significantly more likely to make rational exercise 
decisions compared to biased decisions. The difference was statistically significant for project 1 (χ1
2= 46.22, p 
< .05), project 2 (χ1
2 = 46.22, p < .001), project 4(χ1
2 = 46.22, p < .05), and portfolio 3 (χ1
2 = 46.22, p < .001), 
which Table 7 shows. These results show that, for projects 1, 2, and 4, IT managers were significantly more 
likely to prefer rational decisions over biased decisions. However, for portfolio 3, IT managers were significantly 
more likely to prefer biased decisions over rational decisions. For project 3, portfolio 1, and portfolio 2, the 
differences between rational and biased decisions were statistically insignificant. 
Table 7. Individual Project Scenario and Portfolio Responses (N = 310) 
 No. of rational decisions 
(percentage) 
No. of biased decisions 
(percentage) 
Chi-square 
(p-value) 
Project 1 
(small project-growth option) 
173 
(55.8%) 
137 
(44.2%) 
4.181 
(<0.05) 
Project 2 
(small project-abandonment option) 
243 
(78.4%) 
67 
(21.6%) 
99.92 
(<.001) 
Project 3 
(large project-growth option) 
146 
(47.1%) 
164 
(52.9%) 
1.05 
(0.307) 
Project 4 
(large project--abandonment option) 
174 
(56.1%) 
136 
(43.9%) 
4.66 
(<0.05) 
Portfolio 1 
(small-scale independent projects) 
144 
(46.5%) 
166 
(53.5%) 
1.56 
(0.21) 
Portfolio 2 
(small-scale interdependent projects) 
152 
(49.0%) 
158 
(51.0%) 
0.116 
(0.733) 
Portfolio 3 
(large-scale independent projects) 
86 
(27.7%) 
224 
(72.3%) 
61.43 
(<.001) 
4.1.1 Single Projects: Effect of Project Size 
To test project size effects (H1a and H1b), we compared the responses between small and large projects 
with the same option type using the non-parametric Cochran’s Q test (Cochran, 1950). The tests showed 
significant differences between projects 1 and 3 (χ1
2 = 8.01, p < .01) and between projects 2 and 4 (χ1
2 = 
46.22, p < .001), which indicates that project size intensified the biased decisions for growth options and for 
abandonment options. Combining these results with the frequency analysis in Table 7, we found that, for 
growth option scenarios, the percentage of rational responses decreased significantly from 55.8 percent in 
small projects to 47.1 percent in large projects. Similarly, for abandonment option scenarios, the percentage 
of rational responses decreased from 78.4 percent in small projects to 56.1 percent in large projects. Thus, 
                                                     
5 Complete survey and additional details for decision scenario profiles and independent and dependent variables are available in the 
supplementary material. 
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biased decisions were more prevalent in large projects with real options than in small projects, which 
supports H1a and H1b. Also, the effect was relatively stronger for the abandonment option (with 22.3% drop 
in rational responses) than for the growth option (with 8.7% drop in rational responses). 
4.1.2 Single Projects: Real Option Type 
To test for loss-aversion (H1c), we compared the responses between the growth and abandonment options 
for projects of similar size using the non-parametric Cochran’s Q test for correlated samples. The tests 
showed significant differences between project 1 and 2 responses (χ1
2 = 35.00, p < .001) and between 
project 3 and 4 responses (χ1
2 = 5.6, p = .018), which indicates that the real option type affected the intensity 
of biased decisions in single projects. Furthermore, the proportion of biased decisions was greater for the 
growth option regardless of project size, which suggests that IT managers did not show significant loss 
aversion. Thus, IT managers were more prone to making biased decisions for growth options by exhibiting 
risk-averse behavior as compared to the abandonment option. Hence, our results reject H1c. 
4.2 Real Option Exercise Decisions in IT Portfolios 
To test the decision making trend in the portfolios (H2a), we used non-parametric frequency analysis. 
Further, we used repeated measures ANOVA to examine the isolation effect due to changing scenarios 
from single projects to portfolio on real option exercise decisions (H2b). The frequency analysis (Table 7) 
showed a significantly higher proportion of biased decisions taken for portfolio 1 (53.5%), portfolio 2 (51%), 
and portfolio 3 (72.3%). These results illustrate the presence of biased portfolio decisions for all of the project 
portfolios. We used the Chi-square test to test whether the proportions of rational decisions and biased ones 
differed significantly. The difference was statistically significant for portfolio 3 (χ1
2= 46.22, p < .001). Thus, 
we found partial support for H2a. 
We used repeated measures ANOVA to test the trend of real options' decisions between single projects 
and portfolios. We presented small projects with the growth option and the abandonment option to the 
respondents three times. We first presented them as a single project scenario, then as a portfolio of 
independent projects, and finally as a portfolio of interdependent projects. However, we presented large 
projects with the growth option and the abandonment option to the respondents twice: first as a single project 
and then as a portfolio of independent projects. For the small growth option scenario, repeated measures 
ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that mean option exercise decisions were 
statistically different among the three scenarios (F (1.87, 576.61) = 22.21, p < .001). Post hoc tests using 
the Bonferroni correction revealed that changing the decision scenario for small growth options from a single 
project to a portfolio of independent projects elicited a decrease in biased growth option exercise decisions 
that was statistically significant (p < .001): 71.6 percent of respondents made a rational decision for the 
growth option in the independent portfolio as compared to 55.8 percent of respondents in the single project 
scenario. A similar result held when we changed the decision scenario from a single project to a portfolio of 
interdependent projects (p < .001) with 71 percent of respondents making a rational decision. Thus, a 
portfolio elicited a statistically significant decrease in biased decisions for growth options as compared to a 
single project regardless of interdependency among portfolio resources. We found similar results for the 
large growth option with significantly different exercise decisions between the two scenarios (F (1, 309) = 
9.382, p < .01). Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that, for a large project, changing 
the decision scenario from a single project to a portfolio of independent projects elicited a statistically 
significant decrease in biased decisions (p < .01): 55.5 percent of respondents made rational decisions for 
the growth option in a portfolio as compared to 47.1 percent of respondents in a single project scenario. 
For the small abandonment option scenario, mean exercise decisions were significantly different among the 
three scenarios (F (1.96, 606.37) = 9.979, p < .001). Changing the decision scenario from a single project 
to a portfolio of independent projects or to a portfolio of interdependent projects elicited an increase in biased 
abandonment option exercise decisions that was statistically significant (p < .001; p < .01): 66.5 percent of 
respondents made rational decisions for the abandonment option in a portfolio as compared to 78.4 percent 
of respondents in a single project scenario. Hence, portfolios elicited a statistically significant increase in 
biased decisions for abandonment options as compared to single projects. 
The results were different for large abandonment options where the mean exercise decisions did not differ 
significantly between the two scenarios (F (1, 309) = 1.33, p = 0.25). This result shows that changing the 
decision scenario from a single project to a portfolio of independent projects did not impact abandonment 
option exercise decisions: 52.6 percent of respondents made a rational decision for the abandonment option 
in the portfolio as compared to 56.1 percent of respondents in the single project scenario. Hence, for the 
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large project with an abandonment option, changing scenarios from a single project to a portfolio did not 
affect the exercise decisions. The proportion of biased decisions in the large project with an abandonment 
option was large, and the trend stayed the same in the large portfolio. In summary, the risk behavior changed 
significantly as the real option exercise decision changed from a single decision to a portfolio decision, which 
rejects H2b. This result indicates some other underlying reason for narrow framing, and we provide possible 
explanation in Section 5. 
To confirm narrow framing in the portfolio setting, we compared the results of the small independent project 
portfolio6 with the results of the simplified question7. The test showed a significant difference between 
choices made in the portfolio and the simplified decision scenario (χ1
2 = 114.6, p < .001). This result shows 
that, when we removed uncertainty from the portfolio outcome, most of the respondents changed their 
preferred decision and went for the optimal portfolio outcome, which confirms the existence of narrow 
framing bias in portfolios. 
4.2.1 IT Portfolios: Resource Interdependency and the Effect of Project Size 
We tested Hypotheses 3 and 4 by comparing the results of respective portfolios using Cochran’s Q test. To 
test the effects of resource interdependency among projects in the IT portfolio, we compared the portfolio 
results of the small independent portfolio (portfolio 1) with the small interdependent portfolio (portfolio 2). 
The tests showed no significant difference (χ1
2 = 0.889, p = 0.346). Hence, the interdependency among 
projects in a portfolio did not facilitate decision quality in the IT portfolio, which does not support H3. We 
further confirmed the result with a repeated measures analysis. 
To test the size effects in portfolios (H4), we compared the results of the small independent portfolio with 
those of the large independent portfolio. The tests showed significant differences (χ1
2 =34.327, p < .001). 
Hence, the projects’ size did impact the narrow framing effects in an IT portfolio. From the comparative 
analysis of portfolios in Table 7, we found that the percentage of rational responses decreased from 46.5 
percent in portfolio 1 to 27.7 percent in portfolio 3, where the decrease was significant. Hence, increase in 
project size increased narrow framing effects instead of reducing them, which supports H4. This result is 
counter-intuitive to the prospect theory but consistent with prior IS literature and shows that decision makers 
who handle large IT portfolios are more likely to fall prey to narrow framing as compared to those who handle 
small IT portfolios. Table 8 summarizes the results. 
Table 8. Summary of Hypotheses Support 
Hypothesis Support 
H1a: IT managers are more likely to make a suboptimal decision for a large IT project 
with a growth option than for a small IT project with a growth option.  
Supported 
H1b: IT managers are more likely to make a suboptimal decision for a large IT project 
with an abandonment option than for a small IT project with an abandonment option. 
Supported 
H1c: IT managers are more likely to make a suboptimal exercise decision for an IT 
project with an abandonment option than for a similar IT project with a growth option. 
Not supported 
H2a: When IT managers exercise real options in an IT portfolio, they are likely to 
make suboptimal exercise decisions. 
Partially supported 
H2b: For an IT project, IT managers’ real option exercise decisions will remain the 
same whether the project is evaluated independently or as a part of a portfolio. 
Not supported 
H3: Recognition of resource interdependency among projects in an IT portfolio will 
improve the portfolio’s rational exercise decision making by IT managers. 
Not supported 
H4: Increasing project sizes in an IT portfolio will reduce the portfolio’s rational 
exercise decision making by IT managers. 
Supported 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Our results indicate that managers consistently made suboptimal real options’ exercise decisions in both 
single IT projects and project portfolios. In single projects, regardless of their size, IT managers were risk 
averse while exercising growth options and risk seeking while exercising abandonment options. Though IT 
                                                     
6 See portfolio question in the sample survey provided in the supplementary material. 
7 See the last question in sample survey provided in the supplementary material. 
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managers value projects with growth options the most (Tiwana et al., 2006), we found that they did not 
exercise options in a risk-neutral manner. We observed IT managers’ risk aversion at option exercise time. 
Instead of realizing the optimal value of the growth option, they played it safe. However, for abandonment 
options, we found most respondents making a risk-neutral decision when the project involved was small. 
Although IT managers value the projects with option to abandon less (Tiwana et al., 2006), we found that 
they optimally exercised this option. Real options suffered from biased decision making in portfolios as well. 
These findings indicate a potential vulnerability of project management based on ROT. 
We found some exceptions to prospect theory as well. For the effect of project size, our results contradict 
prospect theory. In both single projects and portfolios, the proportion of biased decisions increased significantly 
for large projects. For growth options, some IT managers became more conservative while exercising the 
option for large projects. One can explain this phenomenon in several ways. Several risk factors affect large 
IS projects: organizational fit, skill mix, management structure and strategy, system design, user involvement 
and training, and technology planning and integration (Sumner, 2000). Hence, as the project becomes capital 
intensive, the associated risks increase as well. Most of these risk factors are systematic, and managers have 
less control over their mitigation. In turn, this lack of control may cause managers to avoid risk to save the 
project as agency theory for managerial decision making explains (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and, thus, 
lead to more conservative investment strategies. The IS literature suggests that, under high uncertainty, 
managers value deferral options more than growth options (Lankton & Luft, 2008). We find evidence from 
theory (Benaroch et al., 2006a) and from practice (Leslie & Michaels, 1997) that IT managers are reluctant to 
use growth options with high uncertainty, which may also explain our results. 
The type of project embedding a growth opinion significantly determines the option’s value. For example, 
managers value growth options embedded in strategic projects more than those in transactional projects 
(Dimakopoulou, Pramatari, & Doukidis, 2012). The IS literature suggests that IT platforms benefit more from 
growth options (Dai, Kauffman, & March 2007; Fichman, 2004; Taudes, Feurstein, & Mild, 2000) because they 
have a strategic orientation. Similarly, lack of competition may also lead one to not exercise growth options (Zhu 
& Weyant, 2003). Our project scenarios did not specify the strategic importance of projects to the organizations 
or any other information that could relate to the kind of risks involved and the orientation of the investment 
scenario. Hence, the respondents might have decided to make safe choices due to the stakes involved in the 
decision. Also, economic recession effects might have come into play by impacting the IT investment decision 
makers. Factors such as departmental cost cuts (Botello, 2009) and a shrinking technology market (Ante, 2008) 
could have motivated participants towards conservative investment rather than profit maximization. 
For larger projects with abandonment options, IT managers exhibited risk-seeking behavior and selected 
the riskier and economically suboptimal decision as compared to small projects with the same option. These 
findings are consistent with escalation of commitment behavior in IT projects and contrary to prospect theory 
predictions. The IS literature suggests that reluctance to terminate a project midway comes from its size 
and other factors (Tiwana et al., 2007). One might also explain these results through the sunk cost effect. 
Empirical evidence suggests that decision makers find it hard to ignore the sunk cost while making an 
abandonment decision, which contributes towards escalation of commitment to a failing project (Keil et al., 
2000). Higher sunk costs increase the probability of escalation behavior. On a positive note, our results do 
demonstrate that smaller projects are easier to kill than larger projects—even mid-way through. As such, IT 
managers may not undervalue abandonment options as much as the literature demonstrates, and these 
options may not always be difficult to exercise (Tiwana et al., 2006). 
Our results do not illustrate loss aversion that prospect theory predicts. IT managers were more conservative 
in their decisions and exhibited a tendency to “save” as their choice to abandon poorly performing projects 
demonstrates. They may have been more conservative because losses in IT project decisions are 
organizational losses (as opposed to individual decisions). Hence, managers may be less emotionally 
impacted by losses compared to decisions that result in significant individual losses. 
In portfolio scenarios, we found inconsistency in risk behavior among the decision makers. Narrow framing 
did occur as the significant number of suboptimal decisions evidences. However, the risk behavior also 
changed between portfolios and the single projects. Specifically, the proportion of biased decisions for the 
growth option decreased in portfolio scenarios; it was opposite for the case of small abandonment options. 
Even though most respondents made rational decisions for the small single project with an abandonment 
option, a significant number made biased decisions and exhibited risk-seeking behavior in the portfolio 
setting for the same option. Interestingly, while most respondents made biased decisions for the large single 
project with an abandonment option, their preferences did not change significantly in the portfolio setting. 
Overall, managers took more risk in portfolios that favored only the growth option but not the abandonment 
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option. One might ask if this change of risk behavior depicts an “isolation effect”. Our conclusion is that 
isolation effect did occur but not due to consistency in risk preferences among decision makers. The 
underlying phenomenon could be the avoidance of regret of facing a loss in a portfolio. While taking risk in 
growth options with higher payoffs, the managers might also be trying to avoid regret (Barberis & Huang, 
2006) of facing a certain loss in parallel. Loss aversion also supports the abandonment option decisions 
(Barberis et al., 2006) because we saw a significant increase in biased decisions for abandonment options 
in portfolios as compared to single projects. Given the mix of growth and abandonment options, decision 
makers leaned towards loss aversion in portfolios, which caused narrow framing. One may explain the risk-
taking tendency in portfolios could be the disposition effect that caused the managers’ risk perception to 
change in the portfolios. The disposition effect is reference-dependent behavior and is a special case of 
narrow framing (Kahneman, 2011) that explains investors’ behavior in a portfolio. Due to the disposition 
effect, people tend to realize gains from selling/disposing winners (i.e., getting the gain out of the 
opportunity) too soon and keep the losers for too long by being reluctant to realize the losses from disposing 
them. In our case, contrary to their single project decisions, a majority of the managers invested in the 
project with the growth option and chose not to abandon the poorly performing project. Hence, they took the 
opportunity to get the benefit from the growth option, or selling winners, which was beneficial for the portfolio, 
but they also chose to keep investing in the poorly performing project, similar to riding the losses. 
Another reason for risk behavior change in portfolios might be due to a reference point shift among IT 
managers. Reference point shifts happen due to the availability of multiple candidate reference points where 
the new reference point is a function of past information, also known as adaption (Baucells, Webber, & 
Welfens, 2011). Also, recently experienced gains and losses can impact managers’ risk behavior by making 
them risk takers after a gain (Sullivan & Kida, 1995). In our case, both effects might have come into play in 
the portfolio scenario. Adaption comprised information from the single project growth and abandonment 
options and availability of similar options in the portfolio. With recent experience of a certain gain and a loss 
in single projects (as per our results), managers might have considered these outcomes while making 
portfolio decisions. This information might have affected their reference point of project evaluation and led 
them to take more risk in the portfolio. Hence, managers’ focus changed from loss minimization for projects 
with an abandonment option to taking a chance to breakeven the project with the presence of a growth 
option. These results indicate that risky decision making in a portfolio setting is more complex than prospect 
theory explains (Sullivan & Kida, 1995). We also found that, when we simplified portfolio scenarios, we 
almost eliminated narrow framing. When we simplified portfolio scenarios with real options to remove 
uncertainty and they became less cognitively challenging, decision makers went for the optimal choice. This 
phenomenon is known as preference reversal8. The simplified decision scenario comprised the same 
projects as in the first portfolio but without any mention of real options and related decision variables. When 
we simplified and reframed the portfolio choice(s) such that economic dominance of the combined choice 
was obvious, most of the IT managers’ preferences for portfolio decision changed from risk-driven to risk-
neutral and economically optimal decisions. 
Interdependency among project resources in a portfolio had no significant impact on the narrow framing. 
Although research has shown awareness of alternative uses of the funds that support a project to improve 
decision making (Keil & Robey, 1999; Northcraft & Neale, 1986), it did not hold in our case. In other words, 
resource interdependencies did not initiate competition for scarce resources (Throp, 1999), nor did they act 
as constraints on the portfolio, which previous research has specified as important for portfolio alignment 
(Goldman, 1999). Hence, prospect theory preferences dominated the resource interdependency among IT 
projects in a portfolio and negatively affected the efficient management of the IT portfolio. 
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
We contribute to the IS literature by improving the understanding of real options and IT portfolio 
management. Through this study, we document the evidence of biased real option exercise decisions for 
growth and abandonment options. We also identify some reasons that might inhibit IT managers from 
realizing the real options’ value while exercising them. Such reasons include the type of real option, size of 
involved project, and orientation of decision scenarios (single vs. portfolio). Growth options, although valued 
higher by IT managers, tend to be vulnerable to biased decision making, whereas abandonment options 
seem to be less vulnerable to biased decision making. Our results indicate that single project decision 
scenarios facilitated optimal abandonment option exercise decisions, whereas portfolio scenarios facilitated 
                                                     
8 Preference reversal in prospect theory occurs when people’s preferences change for similar choices when they are presented 
differently (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). 
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optimal growth option exercise decisions. These results indicate the possibility of managing biased real 
option exercise decision making by carefully examining their type and their presentation in a project. Also, 
as the size of a project increases, biased decision making tends to increase. Hence, by knowing about the 
possibility of biased decision making and their potential effects on real options' value, IT managers could 
improve their decision making either with the help of decision tools and group decision making or by being 
conscious of their potential biases. 
Prior literature has recognized the differences in values among different types of real options (Busby & Pitts, 
1997; Miller & Shapira, 2004). Prior research has also recognized such real option value differences at the 
project-selection stage (Tiwana et al., 2007). However, research has not studied the valuation of different 
types of real options at the option exercise stage. One reason for why might be the difficulty in 
conceptualizing real option exercise decisions. Using prospect theory, we provide a nuance understanding 
of IT real option exercise decisions associated with project and portfolio characteristics. We illustrate 
different behaviors based on option types embedded in the project since growth options and abandonment 
options are subject to different types of risk behaviors. 
Our findings provide insights into the consequences of ROT and their effects on real options exercise 
decisions. Our results challenge the general perception of real options as adding to the portfolio value due 
to decision making flexibility because managerial biases can negatively affect the realized value from real 
option exercise decisions. Our findings also identify factors that can help reduce managerial biases, such 
as project size and simplification of portfolio decisions. To improve real options decision making in large IT 
projects and portfolios, we recommend relying less on intuitive decision making and using decision making 
tools. Also, in IT portfolios with real options, we recommend identifying the net effect of combined decisions 
upfront and using available quantitative tools. 
We also extend the understanding of behavioral economics by applying it to the context of IT. Narrow 
framing suggests that decision makers tend to make concurrent decisions in isolation, but the literature on 
IT portfolio management suggests that recognizing resource interdependency among IT projects improves 
the portfolio’s performance by enabling better resource management (Keil & Robey, 1999; Northcraft & 
Neale, 1986). Our results indicate that decisions’ framing dominates how IT managers concurrently evaluate 
projects in portfolios. Also, we found that IT managers’ risk behaviors change in the portfolios, which lead 
to inclusive yet still suboptimal decision making. 
Our findings about increased biased decisions in large projects and portfolios enrich the IT project 
management literature by demonstrating the dominance of the IT scale effects on managers’ thinking over 
the relative gain/loss that prospect theory predicts. Our findings illustrate the differences in biases between 
the management of projects and portfolios of different sizes. Contrary to prospect theory, we found 
intensified risk behaviors for larger projects and portfolios compared to smaller projects and portfolios. 
5.2 Practical Implications 
Our results indicate that real option exercise decisions are not easy and that the biased decision making 
depends on the option type (growth vs. abandonment), project size, and decision scenario (single project 
vs. portfolio). Hence, understanding these factors can help managers in their decision making and help 
them choose where intuitive decision making works and where they need to formalize their decisions. Our 
results also help explain the determinants of overevaluating projects with growth options. Risk-averse 
behavior while exercising growth option can cause the decision maker to take minimal risk by playing it safe 
instead of valuing the option rationally in its face value. Similarly, for the option to abandon in large projects, 
risk-seeking behavior while exercising the option could preclude optimal results. Further, suboptimal real 
options’ exercise decisions in IT portfolios affect IT portfolio management by impacting portfolio outcomes. 
To overcome the managerial bias resulting in risk-seeking and risk-avoiding behaviors, training programs that 
increase managerial awareness of such behaviors could be useful. Focused culture change programs such 
as those that consulting companies9 offer may help. Additionally, supplementing ROT with specific valuation 
and decision evaluation criteria tailored to project or organizational need may be helpful. As Copeland and 
Tufano (2004) discuss, for better real options' management, using simpler models such as the binomial model 
                                                     
9 Some consulting companies that specialize in organizational culture management include Deloitte (http://www2.deloitte.com), Culture 
Consultancy (http://www.cultureconsultancy.com), Gotham Culture (http://www.gothamculture.com). 
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may be helpful. However, one needs to choose the right valuation model that fits the project’s needs and does 
not become overwhelming. Furthermore, one may need to modify budgeting and planning systems. 
Explicitly identifying the real option exercise decision points during their lifecycle and specifying the optimal 
exercise boundaries (rules governing the option exercise decision) may allow managers to stay on track. 
These decision points may come in the form of ranges to guide the managers about making option exercise 
decisions. For example, one may plan an exercise decision around a certain event (e.g., competitors’ 
announcement regarding product release) or the project’s progress. McCarthy and Monkhouse (2002) give 
a good example of guiding principles to facilitate the real option exercise decisions. 
Formally designating the real option exercise responsibility to the IT managers and ensuring their motivation 
may also be helpful. In some instances, optimally exercised real options add value to the projects; however, 
their effects are not convincing. For example, exercising an option to abandon a project may have significant 
economic value. However, cancelling the project may also have political implications, a negative impact on 
managers’ personal reputation, negative impact on staff morale, and so on (Ewusi-Mensah & Przasnuski, 
1991; Keil et al., 2000). In such cases, managers with designated responsibility must be rewarded based 
on the optimal decisions. 
Organizations that can take up the challenge should explicitly recognize and value real options for projects 
from the start, should track their value during the project life cycle, should understand when to commit to 
exercising them, and should train staff in ROV. Our findings can facilitate this training. Implementing 
quantitative measures to track when and whether individuals exercise real options is important for large 
projects with real options and project portfolios. Understanding the variables that can potentially facilitate 
decision making in IT portfolios such as project size and simplification of real options exercise decisions can 
help to control these effects. Research has shown that explicitly accounting for the interdependency among 
IT projects in a portfolio improves the portfolio outcome (Keil & Robey, 1999; Northcraft & Neale, 1986). 
However, our results indicate that doing so does not help to control bias. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
We studied only two types of real options that exist in IT investment scenarios (i.e., growth and abandonment 
options). Several other real options exist in IT projects, including options to defer, switch use, scale, and 
lease (Benaroch, 2002). Studying them from the prospect theory’s perspective would usefully extend this 
study. We focused on the exercise decision. Future research could examine different steps in ROT (i.e., 
from identification to commitment and then to exercise decision to understand the relationships between 
biases in these steps). Future research could consider a longitudinal design to address this issue. Research 
has previously studied the effects of factors such as gender, work experience, and risk attitudes (Khan, 
Kumar, Zhao, & Stylianou, 2013; Khan, Zhao, Kumar, & Stylianou, 2015). However, exploring how such 
factors may influence the real option exercise decisions would also be helpful. 
In order to test the carry-forwarded effects of decisions in single scenarios into portfolios, we presented 
survey questions/decision scenarios to participants first with single projects and then portfolios. Hence, the 
order of scenarios mattered, and we kept it constant for all respondents. Not changing the order of survey 
questions might lead to inter-scenario contamination. Hence, one could test the real option exercise 
decisions using random scenario allocation design in a future study. We used a single population design in 
this study. In the future, one could use an independent sample design to test the effect of framing of real 
options on their exercise decision. 
We presented the outcomes for each real option used in our survey as either a pure gain (for growth options) 
or a pure loss (for abandonment options). The abandonment option scenarios we used are closer to reality. 
However, IT growth options may not always represent a pure gain scenario. Projects that embed a growth 
option always contain an uncertain cost element along with the uncertain benefit in these investments that 
one cannot ignore. Examples include infrastructure investments, ERP systems implementation costs, and 
so on. Also, we created simple project portfolios, but complex portfolios exist in reality with varying degrees 
of interdependency among the projects. Studying the impact of varying interdependencies among projects 
on narrow faming would reasonably extend our study. In our portfolio scenarios, we presented the project 
with the growth option before the project with the abandonment option. Such an order might affect loss 
aversion because the degree of loss aversion depends on prior gains and losses. A loss that comes after 
prior gains is less painful than usual because earlier gains moderate it (Barberis, Huang, & Santos, 2001). 
By contrast, a loss that comes after other losses is more painful than usual. After being burned by the first 
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loss, people become more sensitive to additional setbacks. We also did not check for the effects of 
sequential interdependencies among projects in a portfolio, which could be another extension. 
IT projects vary in nature. As a result, their progress monitoring and control mechanisms vary as well. One 
may evaluate projects multiples times as they progress. However, mid-way evaluations are quite common. As 
such, we set the project progress at 50 percent. In addition, setting the project progress at 50 percent allowed 
for simplicity in calculating the earned value of the project in our decision scenarios while keeping them 
realistic. One could extend our study by evaluating a real option exercise at varying project progress stages, 
which might explain whether project progress is a contributing factor in real option exercise decisions. 
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Appendix A: Decision Profiles and Variables Description 
Single Project Profiles 
The survey comprised four single IT project profiles. For each project, we presented information about the 
embedded option, size of the project, and risk and return associated with real option exercise decisions. 
Each project profile comprised either a growth option or an abandonment option with two outcomes (i.e., a 
risky outcome due to uncertainty and a riskless outcome). The project profiles also varied in size, 
represented by the investment costs and payoffs. Table A1 summarizes the project profiles. For the growth 
option, the risky outcome was to exercise the option by investing further, with probable higher returns. We 
incorporated uncertainty by presenting the outcome with a probability. The corresponding riskless decision 
was set as letting the option expire, leading to a certain but lower outcome. We assumed gains for either 
outcome since growth options are valued higher (Miller & Shapira, 2004; Tiwana et al., 2007) due to the 
potential for larger future benefits. However, the future realized benefits are uncertain when exercising the 
option (Coff & Laverty, 2007). One can argue that deferring the investment can reduce the outcome 
uncertainty. We sought to capture the investment behavior in the absence of such flexibility and to examine 
the risk behavior of IT managers under such situations. In reality, the flexibility to delay the investment is 
usually not used by firms operating in a competitive market, where growth is vital for their survival (Lankton 
& Luft, 2008). Hence, we controlled the survey for absence of deferring the decision. For simplicity, we did 
not account for time value of money. Hence, we did not provide any discount rates in decision scenarios. 
Table A1. Single IT Project Profiles Breakdown 
Project profile Embedded real options Size of the project 
1 Growth Small 
2 Abandonment Small 
3 Growth Large 
4 Abandonment Large 
For the abandonment option, the risky outcome was to continue to invest in a poor-performing project with 
a slight possibility to breakeven. For poor-performing projects, the outcome uncertainty contributes towards 
the risk (Keil et al., 2007). We set the respective riskless outcome for these projects as exercising the option 
to abandon with certain partial loss. Often, in reality, for a project with the option to abandon, the decision 
has to be made between a smaller but sure loss and a probable but larger loss. We consider breakeven as 
the best probable outcome for simplicity. Although, theoretically every investment project can have an option 
to abandon, in reality, there can be several restrictions preventing this option from being exercised. Such 
restrictions include contractual agreements and regulatory ramifications associated with incomplete 
projects. We assume none of these restrictions for the project. 
Further, testing of risky decisions under prospect theory requires the tool to be built around a reference point 
(Kahneman, 2003). For IT managers, the common criterion used to evaluate projects is their NPV (Fichman 
et al., 2005; Keil et al., 2007). Hence, we used project’s NPV as a reference point, which also serves as a 
boundary that distinguishes gains from losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Based on the reference point, 
we presented the growth options in both project profiles as prospects with the possibility of minimum zero 
NPV and the abandonment options as prospects with the possibility of maximum zero NPV.  
Project Portfolio Profiles 
To test for the narrow framing in the IT project portfolios, the survey comprised three IT portfolios. Combining 
the two single project profiles described above created each portfolio. The portfolios varied in terms of the 
interdependency among the projects win the portfolio and the size of the projects. Portfolio 1 was the control. 
Table A2 gives a breakdown on the portfolios’ set up. We evaluated the presence of narrow framing in 
portfolios through the decisions of the respondents in the portfolios and evaluating it against the 
economically optimal choices for those portfolios. In this case, portfolio’s performance might suffer from 
either suboptimal decision for either or both the option exercise decisions. Further portfolio scenarios helped 
us in testing the consistency in risk behaviors among decision makers throughout the survey. 
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Table A2. IT Project Portfolios Breakdown 
Portfolio 
Number of 
projects 
Embedded 
options 
Interdependency among 
projects 
Size of projects 
1 
Two 
Growth and 
abandon each 
No Small 
2 Yes Small 
3 No Large 
The last decision scenario tested the effects of simplifying portfolio decisions with real options. Based on 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the optimal alternative is more likely to be recognized if 
choices presented in a portfolio can be further simplified. Hence, in this question, each choice was an 
aggregate outcome of option exercise decisions presented in the control portfolio (i.e., the net NPV adjusted 
for uncertainty in each project). Uncertain decisions are further simplified and represented as single 
expected values. Meanwhile, certain decisions were unchanged. Out of the four choices, three choices were 
theoretically consistent with prospect theory’s predictions, with the remaining one as the optimal choice. 
Independent Variables 
Option type: we focused on growth and abandonment options.  
Uncertainty and payoffs: consistent with reality, we modeled the real option exercise decision as a simple 
“exercise” versus “do not exercise” decision. Growth option exercise decisions are usually high risk-high 
return decisions where risk is contributed by the uncertainty around future outcome. This uncertainty is 
similar to “volatility in asset price” in real option valuation. For example, exercising a growth option means 
investing in an ongoing project further with an aim for higher returns. However, for abandonment option, 
exercise decisions are riskless with a relatively small but certain loss.  
In our survey, each real option decision scenario had a certain outcome and an uncertain outcome. For the 
growth option, the risky decision was the “exercise” decision, which captured the uncertainty associated with 
further investment in the project. For the abandonment option, the risky decision was the “do not exercise” 
decision, which captured the uncertainty associated with not abandoning a project with negative feedback. 
The return from the growth option exercise decision was much higher but with a relatively low probability. Also, 
the probability of projects with the abandonment option to become valuable again was low. Prospect theory 
shows that the threshold for risk behavior change is approximately at 50 percent. Risk-seeking behavior in 
gains and risk-averse behavior in losses are observed for better outcomes with probability less than 50 percent 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Therefore, we chose 25 percent as the probability that the better probable 
outcome would happen in a manner similar to “framing of acts” experiments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
We kept the same uncertainty in all scenarios for simplicity and consistency. We used these probability figures 
as an approximation of volatility in asset price (future project payoffs), covered under a real option. We used 
payoffs data based on real ERP systems cost figures to make them realistic. ERP systems are a good example 
of IT projects and project portfolios due to their wide implementation. Also, these investments are considered 
important due to the variety of applications that are enabled by the ERP systems. The average costs we found 
for ERP systems ranged from approximately US$0.4 Million to US$2.3 Million (Aberdeen, 2007). We kept 
payoffs in all the profiles close to these figures. The payoffs varied only for each real option scenario based 
on project size. We give the details on the project sizes below. 
Project size: to control for the projects’ size, we chose US$0.5 million for small projects and US$2.0 million 
for large projects. We positioned all the projects as completed mid-way, where the project progress and 
resource investment was set at 50 percent. So the earned value for small projects became US$0.25 million 
and US$1.0 million for the large projects. Earned value enabled us to create a suitable decision point in 
terms of planned value of the projects. Respondents had to decide the future of the projects purely based 
on the embedded real option. Table A3 breakdowns the payoffs values and respective probabilities. 
Consistent with prospect theory, we kept the net payoff difference between risky and riskless options the 
same in small and large projects (equal to US$200,000) to capture the size effects.  
Resource interdependency: we created resource interdependency in one of the portfolios by explicitly 
mentioning the flexibility in resources (funds and human) use between the projects. 
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Dependent Variable: Option Exercise Decision 
Control variables: we controlled the survey for gender based on risk behavior differences (Fellner & 
Maciejovsky, 2007) age, work experience (Liu, Wang, & Zhao, 2010), industry sector, and country. For 
industry sectors, we used distinction of manufacturing and services. 
Table A3. Uncertainty and Payoffs used in Decision Scenarios 
 
Small 
Projects 
Growth Abandon 
Exercise Expire Exercise Expire 
Pr. Payoff Pr. Payoff Pr. Payoff Pr. Payoff 
25% $1,800,000 100% $250,000 100% $(250,000) 75% $(600,000) 
Expected 
Value 
$450,000 $250,000 $(250,000) $(450,000) 
Difference $200,000 $(200,000) 
 
Large 
Projects 
Growth Abandon 
Exercise Expire Exercise Expire 
Pr. Payoff Pr. Payoff Pr. Payoff Pr. Payoff 
25% $4,800,000 100% $1,000,000 100% $(1,000,000) 75% $(1,600,000) 
Expected 
Value 
$1,200,000 $1,000,000 $(1,000,000) $(1,200,000) 
Difference $200,000 $(200,000) 
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Appendix B: Complete Survey 
General Instructions 
You will be evaluating four individual IT projects and three IT portfolios in order to determine their future 
direction. 
 Each IT portfolio consists of two IT projects that may or may not be related. 
 Each project (individual and in portfolios) that you will be evaluating in this survey, will have 
either an option to invest further in it for its future expansion (option to grow) or an option to kill 
it before it is completed (option to abandon). 
 You will be given information regarding expected future payoffs from the project and the 
uncertainty around these payoffs. 
Evaluation of Individual Projects 
 All the projects are approximately mid-way in their life cycle i.e. they have spent 50% of their 
allocated budget and are only 50% complete. 
 The estimated net present value (NPV) for each project depends on your decision. NPV of a 
project is the net future cash inflows of the project, adjusted for the time value of money. 
 Based on the information given, please make a decision in terms of exercising the option 
(described below). 
IT Project Portfolio 1 of 4 
This project has the option to grow (further investment in this IT project may enhance future revenues). Your choices 
are as follows. 
Invest (exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $1,800,000 
75% chance of NPV being $0 
Invest (exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $1,800,000 
75% chance of NPV being $0 
 
What would you choose to do for Project 1? 
 Invest (exercise the option) 
 Do not invest (do not exercise the option) 
IT Project Portfolio 2 of 4 
This project has the option to abandon (further investment in this IT project may reduce future revenues). Your 
choices are as follows. 
Abandon (exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being - $250,000 
Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $0 
75% chance of NPV being - $600,000 
 
What would you choose to do for Project 2? 
 Abandon (exercise the option) 
 Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
IT Project Portfolio 3 of 4 
This project has the option to grow (further investment in this IT project may enhance future revenues). Your choices 
are as follows. 
invest (exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $4,800,000 
75% chance of NPV being $0 
Do not invest (do not exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being $1,000,000 
 
399 Examining Real Options Exercise Decisions in Information Technology Investments 
 
Volume 18   Issue 5  
 
What would you choose to do for Project 3? 
 Invest (exercise the option) 
 Do not invest (do not exercise the option) 
IT Project Portfolio 4 of 4 
This project has the option to abandon (further investment in this IT project may reduce future revenues). Your 
choices are as follows. 
Abandon (exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being - $1,000,000 
Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $0 
75% chance of NPV being - $1,600,000 
 
What would you choose to do for Project 4? 
 Abandon (exercise the option) 
 Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
Evaluation of IT Project Portfolios 
Next, you will be evaluating three IT project portfolios. Each project portfolio consists of two IT projects and 
some information on resources allocated to them. 
 Each project within these project portfolios gives you a decision flexibility of either investing in it 
further for its growth (option to grow) or killing the project (option to abandon). 
 All the projects in the portfolios are approximately mid-way in their life cycle, i.e. they have spent 
50% of their allocated budget and are only 50%complete. 
Based on the information given, please make a decision in terms of exercising the option for each 
project within the portfolio. 
IT Portfolio Profile 1 of 3 
Both projects in this portfolio are independent of each other in terms of resources. This means each 
project in the portfolio has its own pool of financial and human resources. 
 
This project has the option to grow (further investment in this IT project may enhance future revenues). Your choices 
are as follows. 
invest (exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $1,800,000 
75% chance of NPV being $0 
Do not Invest (do not exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being $250,000 
This project has the option to abandon (further investment in this IT project may reduce future revenues). Your 
choices are as follows. 
Abandon (exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being - $250,000 
Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $0 
75% chance of NPV being - $600,000 
 
What would you choose to do for each project in Portfolio 1? 
 Exercise the option Do not exercise the option 
Project 1 (growth option) ○ ○ 
Project 2 (abandonment option) ○ ○ 
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IT Portfolio Profile 2 of 3 
Both projects in this portfolio have resource dependency. This means each project in the portfolio share 
the same pool of financial and human resources. This sharing of resources among the projects within this 
portfolio means that the resources from one project can be utilized in another project. 
 
This project has the option to grow (further investment in this IT project may enhance future revenues). Your choices 
are as follows. 
Invest (exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $1,800,000 
75% chance of NPV being $0 
Do not invest (do not exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being $250,000 
This project has the option to abandon (further investment in this IT project may reduce future revenues). Your 
choices are as follows. 
Abandon (exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being - $250,000 
Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $0 
75% chance of NPV being - $600,000 
 
What would you choose to do for each project in Portfolio 2? 
 Exercise the option Do not exercise the option 
Project 1 (growth option) ○ ○ 
Project 2 (abandonment option) ○ ○ 
 
IT Portfolio Profile 3 of 3 
Both projects in this portfolio are independent of each other in terms of resources. This means each 
project in the portfolio has its own pool of financial and human resources. 
 
This project has the option to grow (further investment in this IT project may enhance future revenues). Your choices 
are as follows. 
Invest (exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $4,800,000 
75% chance of NPV being $0 
Do not invest (do not exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being $1,000,000 
This project has the option to abandon (further investment in this IT project may reduce future revenues). Your 
choices are as follows. 
Abandon (exercise the option) 
 
100% chance of NPV being - $1,000,000 
Do not abandon (do not exercise the option) 
 
25% chance of NPV being $0 
75% chance of NPV being - $1,600,000 
 
What would you choose to do for each project in Portfolio 3? 
 Exercise the option Do not exercise the option 
Project 1 (growth option) ○ ○ 
Project 2 (abandonment option) ○ ○ 
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Based on your own experience and knowledge please choose between the following sets of decisions. 
Suppose you are managing a portfolio of two projects. Project 1 has the option to grow and Project 2 has 
the option to abandon. Which of the following choices will be your decision for this portfolio? 
 
 Realize Net Present Value of $250,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -250,000 for 
project 2. 
 Realize Net Present Value of $250,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -450,000 for 
project 2. 
 Realize Net Present Value of $450,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -250,000 for 
project 2. 
 Realize Net Present Value of $450,000 for project 1 and Net Present Value of $ -450,000 for 
project 2.  
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